

9

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The following paper was prepared by Paul Treadwell, Intelligence Research Specialist for South Asia, and Craig Harp, Afghanistan analyst of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It is a sequel to Special Report 112, "Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation."

SUMMARY

After 6 years of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan remains a turbulent, war-torn country. During the past year, the Afghan resistance continued to wage guerrilla warfare, thwarting Soviet efforts to extend regime control. With a modest increase of its troops in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was unable to force a dramatic reduction in the resistance.

Although the military impasse continues, significant changes occurred in both Soviet and resistance tactics. The U.S.S.R. has stepped up the pace of the war since Konstantin Chernenko became the Soviet leader in February 1984. The Soviets increased attacks on civilians, expanded their use of air power, employed high-level saturation bombing, and deployed Soviet forces more often and in greater number.

The mujahidin (resistance fighters) offset these intensified Soviet actions by using more sophisticated weaponry and tactics and improving cooperation among various fighting groups. These changes were most apparent in their defense of the Panjsher Valley against the seventh Soviet offensive and during the mujahidin attacks on Kabul.

The Afghan Government in Kabul is unable to extend its authority effectively outside the capital. The Soviet-backed

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) continues to suffer from infighting, disloyalty, and defections among the ranks.

Living conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate. With fighting throughout the country, no one in Afghanistan can feel secure. Food, electricity, fuel, and medical care are frequently in short supply. Although the flow of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan has diminished considerably since 1982, the presence of the largest refugee population in the world strains the resources of Pakistan. Meanwhile, violations of Pakistan's territory by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) continued throughout 1984. Overflights and shellings increased in frequency and intensity during August and September.

No significant progress occurred in the UN-sponsored negotiations during 1984. The United States supports the negotiations, as well as the UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan approved again this year. Another round of indirect talks is expected in February 1985.

Although the negotiations continue, the Soviets appear determined to retain control of Afghanistan by remodeling the Afghan political and social structure in the Soviet image. In the short term, this entails maintaining their client regime in power in Kabul and cutting off the resistance from its bases of support. Control over countrywide security, education, and the economy, and the development of a committed socialist cadre, are each essential to an apparent long-term strategy to subvert Afghanistan.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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MILITARY SITUATION

In 1984, as since 1980, the Soviets and the resistance remain at an impasse with neither side able to make significant or lasting gains at the expense of their enemy. Major combat activity occurred in all areas of the country, concentrated around the major cities, the Panjaher Valley, and provinces bordering Pakistan.

Eastern Afghanistan

Kabul. The resistance succeeded in threatening the overall security of Kabul, the bastion of Soviet/PDPA regime control, particularly in late summer and fall. Besides occasional assassinations and kidnappings of Soviet and regime officials, and the occasional food and fuel shortages caused by the resistance interdiction of supply convoys, the resistance used ground assaults, rocket attacks, electrical outages, and bombings to make Kabul appear at times to be a city under siege.

As a result of these attacks, the security situation deteriorated substantially. The Soviets responded by tightening security throughout the city and around the airport and by increasing retaliatory attacks on areas from which the mujahidin had launched their attacks.

The heaviest fighting inside Kabul in 1984 occurred in September. On September 24 the resistance coordinated a heavy assault on several targets, in one of the largest attacks on Kabul since the war began, that culminated in an intense 2-hour battle near the military base at the Bala Hissar fortress in the heart of the city. Fifteen Soviet armored vehicles were destroyed and 40-50 Afghan soldiers killed in the clash. As is typical after such attacks, the Soviets retaliated with air and ground forces, targeting villages south of Kabul and inflicting civilian casualties.

Throughout the year the resistance regularly and successfully rocketed selected areas of Kabul but sometimes struck unintended targets. Rockets landed near the U.S. Embassy and other foreign missions, where only minor damage occurred, and other parts of the city, where greater damage sometimes resulted.

In the latter part of the year, rocket attacks occurred with increasing frequency and intensity. One of the most intense attacks occurred on September 20 with at least 16 or 17 rockets hitting the eastern part of Kabul. Afterward,

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Soviet helicopters characteristically retaliated against the civilian population in villages south of Kabul. In another incident, the Soviet Embassy celebration of this anniversary of the October Revolution was disrupted when the

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sound of rockets exploding nearby caused the hurried departure of guests. In late November and early December, Kabul suffered additional major rocket attacks.

The resistance caused severe electrical outages in Kabul during August and September by destroying a series of pylons from the hydroelectric plant at Sorubi, east of Kabul. During this operation the resistance obtained the collaboration of a local tribal group which the Soviets previously had attempted to coopt. This action was filmed by a television crew and broadcast in the United States. After the operation was complete, the entire group of over 4,000 men, women, and children made the long trek to Pakistan. As a result of these attacks, severe shortages of electricity occurred in Kabul for several weeks. Most homes were without electricity, and many factories were forced to curtail operation, further damaging Kabul's troubled industrial sector.

[third paragraph]

be attributed to resistance activity, but many others were probably the result of longstanding factionalism within the Afghan government.

At the end of 1984, the Soviets continued to garrison bases from the southern mouth to around the middle of the Panjsher Valley at Peshghor. Combat continues, particularly near Bazarek and Rokheh. The Soviets conducted a second sweep operation of limited inten-

city and during the late fall in order to retain Soviet/DRA positions in the valley for the winter.

Pakistan Border Areas. The Soviets stepped up efforts to seal off border-crossing routes from Pakistan. Sweeping operations, caravan ambushes, and airstrikes were frequently conducted in Paktia, Paktika, Nangrahar, and Konarha Provinces. Garrisons were fortified and reinforced with Soviet and Afghan troops.

Despite a higher Soviet and DRA profile in the border areas, a number of resistance groups cooperated and succeeded in besieging Soviet and regime posts in the Khawza area in Paktia Province. Garrisons often could be resupplied by air only, which was risky and vulnerable to interdiction. Reportedly, Afghan regime governors held only four of the province's 28 districts in September 1984. Practically all the major parties, both fundamentalist and moderate, are represented in the insurgent force in Paktia.

Jaji (Ali Khel), also in Paktia, and Barikot, farther north in Konarha Pro-

vince, have been important in Soviet resistance efforts. These areas are close to the Pakistan border, an traditional route through the mountains. These garrisons hinder Soviet troop movements through the passes and are under such pressure that they are supplied by Soviet/DRA efforts to relieve them. Pressure include airstrikes, which several times in recent months spilled over the Pakistan border. To justify these attacks, Kabul has accused Pakistani forces of attacking the posts. The charges have been rejected by Pakistan, which has strenuously protested the violations of its territory.

Paghman. Successive waves of Soviet air and ground assaults in late 1984 forced out most of the resistance operating in Paghman, a former resort town only 20 kilometers from Kabul.

Southern Afghanistan


Qandahar. In Qandahar, probably the most war-torn city in Afghanistan, fighting took place inside the city nearly

every night. During the day, resistance was often subdued to artillery pounding and shelling by Soviet helicopters from the nearby air base. Attempts to house warlords, arbitrary bombings, frequent gangbats between regime soldiers and the resistance continued in previous years.

The road linking the city and the airport is no longer safe even for armored personnel carriers (APCs). The governor of Qandahar, who previously traveled to work in an APC, is now forced to stay at the nearby Soviet air base and to make his rare visits to the city solely by helicopter. Late in the year, the Soviets strengthened their garrisons in the area, presaging more winter activity by Soviet forces.

Western Afghanistan

Herat. Approximately half of the city has been destroyed by bombardment. Although Herat had a population of nearly 150,000 before the Soviet invasion, today entire sections of the city are almost deserted. Money is in short supply, and little employment is available.



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In early June 1984, the Soviets carried out their largest offensive against resistance bases in and near Herat since the invasion. In the face of overwhelming opposition (10,000 Soviet and 6,000 DRA), the resistance fought a delaying action, trying to keep casualties to a minimum, while retreating from their positions in and around the city to the mountains in the north. Some resistance forces took temporary sanctuary in Iran.

In the fall, the Soviets again concentrated troops and artillery in the Herat area and began to move against the resistance. As in the Qandahar area, climatic conditions permit fighting in western Afghanistan to continue throughout the winter.

Northern Afghanistan

In general, the Soviets control the flat northern region of Afghanistan, which borders Soviet Central Asia, more effectively than any of the other four regions. This area contains the valuable natural gas of the Sheberghan region. Soviet troops sometimes have been deployed directly into northern Afghanistan from the Soviet border.

Masar e Sharif; Mazar e Sharif remained relatively calm, although scattered fighting occurred occasionally at night. Afghan troops provide most of the security, and the Soviet presence is limited inside the city.

Central Afghanistan

The Soviets have given the least priority to controlling this region, known as the Hazarajat, which is the most geographically isolated of the five regions. Internecine fighting among various resistance groups is common. Shia and Sunni groups more often fight among themselves than against the Soviets. Within the Shia groups themselves, the Iranian-backed factions have fought against the other factions.

One of the most chilling actions of the war apparently took place in the Hazarajat, in early November. Their ammunition exhausted, a large number of *mujahidin* were forced to surrender to a combined force of Soviet/DRA troops. Reportedly, after the *mujahidin* were rounded up, the Soviet commander ordered that they all be summarily executed.

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term strategy for control of Afghanistan. The Soviets have experienced considerable difficulty in pursuing those strategies over their 5 years of occupation, yet the Soviet Government continues both approaches.

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Short-term strategies

Foremost among their immediate goals, the Soviets want to maintain the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The vast majority of Afghans are opposed to the Soviet supported regime. Without Soviet military backing, the Kabul government would most likely be overthrown within a short time. The USSR keeps sufficient troops in Afghanistan to assure DRA survival and minimum security in the capital.

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of large areas in Afghanistan, either because of flight to the cities or emigration of other countries, has made it more difficult for the resistance to function.

The Soviets have encouraged the Kabul regime to pursue a divide and rule strategy similar to the methods used to absorb Central Asia into the Soviet Union 50 years ago. The regime has offered bribes of money and weapons to the many independent tribes, particularly in the sensitive regions that border Pakistan. This program has often backfired, as tribes often take the money and guns and instead support the resistance. Also, KHAD agents infiltrate the resistance to assassinate resistance leaders, encourage infighting among different resistance groups, or report on the plans and positions of resistance forces.

An essential element of the Soviets' long-term strategy is the focus on the new generation. The Soviets hope to create a new elite, one committed to a pro-Soviet future for Afghanistan and which provides a loyal party and administrative cadre. In the school, communist ideology is promoted, while national disciplines are neglected [illeg]

...the Soviet control over the resistance movement in Afghanistan, which has been the Soviet Union's main effort to bring about the end of the Soviet presence in the country. The Soviet Union has been unable to control the resistance movement in the mountainous regions. Soviet troops are not able to control the mountainous regions. Soviet troops are not able to control the mountainous regions. Soviet troops are not able to control the mountainous regions.

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THE SOVIET OCCUPATION: SHORT AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviets can be observed to have both short- and long-

term strategies. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union.

The Soviets' short-term strategy consists of controlling all urban areas in an attempt to control the Afghan population. Urban populations are accessible and less able to provide sanctuary to the resistance than in the remote countryside. In Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and some other urban centers, the people depend on Soviet imported food and fuel. Furthermore, employment and education can be monitored and manipulated more easily in cities.

The Soviets are trying to reduce the ability of the resistance to operate in the countryside. Their classic counterinsurgency strategy involves simultaneously reducing the population outside areas of regime control that can shelter and support the guerrillas and restricting the surplus food and other materials needed to provide such support. In pursuing this goal the Soviets use terror tactics, including military assaults and retribution, to dissuade the Afghan civilian population from assisting the resistance. In areas of significant resistance support, the Soviets have forced civilians to leave the countryside by bombing villages and destroying farm land. The depopulation


of the countryside has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union.

Long-term Strategies

Given the utter failure of their efforts to broaden regime support, the Soviets have decided to pursue a long-term strategy of "sovietization" or building a party and an administrative structure in Afghanistan modeled along Soviet lines and sensitive to Soviet interests. In pursuing this goal the Soviet Union has made limited progress.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, Soviet long-term strategy focuses on the gradual extension of security and control throughout the country and on increasing the ability of the Kabul regime to perform this task. To implement this they have attempted, albeit with little success, to rebuild the Afghan Army. Ultimately this will require adequate numbers of recruits who are willing to defend a pro-Soviet regime, a prospect that remains far off.

An essential element of the Soviet long-term strategy is the focus on the new generation. The Soviets hope to create a new elite and committed to the pro-Soviet future for Afghanistan, which provides a political and administrative cadre. In the past, the Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been the least priority in the region, known as the Soviet Union.



PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

virtues are extolled in class Russian language study is mandatory at Kabul University.

The Soviets send Afghan youth to the U.S.S.R. for indoctrination in a setting isolated from their families and Afghan influences, but the success of these programs has been mixed. Youth training and education programs involve around 4,000 students sent to the Soviet Union each year for advanced political indoctrination. Already 20,000-25,000 students have been sent for such studies, more than 10,000 since 1979.

Apparently these few years of indoctrination are insufficient to mold loyal cadre. Yet the Soviets began a new program in 1984 involving plans to send thousands of children between 7 and 10 years of age, from all provinces to the Soviet Union for more than 10 years. In November, 870 Afghan children between the ages of 7 and 9 were sent to the U.S.S.R. for 10 years of schooling.

Another element of the long-term plan is the economic integration of Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit. The Soviets hope gradually to control more and more of Afghanistan's natural resources and industry. Natural gas from Afghanistan's rich northern Sheberghan gas fields is bartered for Soviet imports and to repay Afghan debts to the Soviet Union.

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The official most strongly critical in that meeting was Minister of Defense Abdul Qadar, a staunch Parcham [illeg] early December he was replaced [illeg]

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Defense Minister by Chief of Staff Nur Mohammad, a Khalq oriented military professional who has spent several years in the Soviet Union.

Another significant regime change was the posting of former Minister of Finance Abdul Wakil, a cousin of Karmal, as Ambassador to Vietnam. Diplomatic assignments to socialist countries as when Karmal himself was sent to Prague, have been used by the regime to get prominent but unwanted figures out of the country where they can do (or come to) no harm.

KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service was a small organization under the state police with a limited role in intelligence collection and state security before the Soviet invasion. After the Soviet takeover this service was named KHAD, enlarged and strengthened and given authority over all intelligence aspects of Afghan affairs at home and abroad. Soviet advisers were installed, and KHAD became unofficially subordinate to the KGB. KHAD has frequently exercised its power to jail or discredit national-level officials, confiscate property, infiltrate the resistance, and indoctrinate the populace in communism.

Afghan Military. Parcham-Khalq factionalism contributes substantially to the ineffectiveness of the military. Armed clashes, low morale, insufficient manpower, collaboration with the resistance, and lessened security are all symptomatic of this dispute. Furthermore, many conscripts from the military defect because of unwillingness to participate in Soviet reprisals on civilians, Soviet heavy-handedness and arrogance, and the use of Afghan soldiers as "canon fodder." The Afghan military has dwindled from about 90,00 troops in December 1979 to about 40,000 in late 1984.

The majority of Afghan soldiers are conscripted, often by press-gang techniques, and in 1984 the draft age was lowered from 17 to 16 in March, when the length of military service for troops serving in Kabul was extended from 8 to 4 years, large numbers of soldiers mutinied. Because of the high rate of desertions with weapons, Afghan soldiers must turn in their equipment when not fighting.

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THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Popular support for the Afghan resistance remains firm among the vast majority of the Afghan people. The resistance movement includes resistance fighters in Afghanistan, parties both inside and outside Afghanistan, and the refugee and exile community. The resistance inside Afghanistan consists of independent local bands, usually affiliated to one or another of the parties. The important parties have

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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formed a three-party "moderate" alliance and a seven-party "fundamentalist" alliance. Numerous other factions are not involved in the alliances.

No major changes occurred in the structure of the resistance during 1984. Some groups of resistance fighters have increased coordination and cooperation in the fight against Soviet /DRA forces. Nevertheless, fighting between resistance groups continues to take place. The emergence of a single leader, or any real political unity, is as elusive as ever.

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Soviet/DRA forces by opening nearby fronts. However, other groups continued to dispute supplies and areas.

In Herat during June, various resistance groups cooperated in evacuating the city center before the beginning of Soviet door-to-door searches. In the last part of the year, as the Soviets turned their attacks to Paktia and Paktika, where they hoped to cut the infiltration routes, effective resistance cooperation included affiliates of the three-party moderate alliance.

Resistance commanders from inside the country continued to voice complaints against the parties' leaders. Charges included unequal distribution of support, selling arms for personal enrichment, and lack of contact with what was going on inside the country. Many commanders say they maintained their allegiances only because it was necessary to obtain arms and appeared willing to support any leaders who would supply them.

Although there is no current threat of widespread famine, poor rain and snowfall, Soviet destruction of agriculture in a particular area. Inter-

the military. The Soviet Union's strategy of "winning the war by winning the peace" has been a failure. The Afghan resistance has been a success.

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Although outgroups and supporters of Zahir Shah continued to meet with resistance leaders in Peshawar and to seek international support for a meeting of all factions of the resistance (Loya Jirga), no meeting was held. The efforts to forge greater resistance unity around ex-king Zahir Shah, begun in 1983, did not appear to have made further progress, although the three-party alliance, which appeared that initiative, continues to function harmoniously. Fundamentalist opposition to any role for the former monarch continued and appeared to have dampened enthusiasm for preparing ahead with the proposed council meeting. Some shifts of alignment were reported within the seven-party alliance. Rivalries and disputes undermined efforts to build alliance unity.

All seven major resistance leaders from Peshawar were invited by the Pakistan Government to attend the Islamic Conference summit in Rabat in January, 1984. They agreed, for the first time, to let fundamentalist leader Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani serve as spokesman for the group. Professor Rabbani also visited France in April to meet with French officials and other private groups.

The Panjshir commander Mahsud continued his efforts to make contact with and develop plans for cooperation with other commanders of the northeast region during the first part of the year. These efforts appeared to pay dividends during the Soviet offensive, as various mujahideen groups made efforts to come to Mahsud's assistance and divert

the Soviet offensive. The Soviet offensive was a failure. The Afghan resistance was a success. The Soviet Union's strategy of "winning the war by winning the peace" has been a failure. The Afghan resistance has been a success.

Depopulation of civilians in strategic areas became a more serious problem for the mujahideen. In the first years of the resistance, mujahideen could count on shelter and food from villages throughout the country. The toll of 5 years of fighting has left many areas—especially those in the east and close to Kabul—almost deserted. Resistance leaders are sometimes forced not only to carry their own food but also to help supply the civilian population.

LIVING CONDITIONS

With about one-third of its pre-1979 population displaced, Afghanistan has had its social structure and economy disrupted in fundamental ways. Afghanistan has suffered severe deterioration in the areas of health, medicine, and education. Nevertheless, food and fuel supplies are generally adequate both among the resistance fighters and Afghan civilians.

Food supplies in Afghanistan are comparable to levels prior to the Soviet invasion mainly because the destructive effects of combat on agriculture and transportation have been offset by the flight of people to other countries. In areas controlled by the Soviets, shortages occur occasionally as a result of resistance interdiction of transportation, but prolonged shortages are rare.

Although there is no current threat of widespread famine, poor crop and snowfall, Soviet destruction of agriculture in a particular area



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ruption of trade could change the local food situation quickly. For example, the Pnjshar offensive-involving massive Soviet bombing that destroyed agriculture and livestock-has caused food shortages among the resistance and the local civilian population.

Although the resistance forces experience inadequate food supplies at times, the need for medicine and medical services is probably greater. Certain international humanitarian organizations, most prominently French groups, such as *Medicina sans Frontieres* and *Aide Medicale Internationale*, are trying to alleviate this desperate situation by maintaining doctors and rudimentary hospitals inside Afghanistan. Soviet and regime forces have often tried to bomb or attack these clinics and in 1983 captured and released a French doctor.

Education has deteriorated considerably since the Soviet invasion. The school system has ceased everywhere except in a few major cities. Perhaps 80% of the Afghan teachers have been executed or imprisoned or have fled the country.

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refugees-the world's largest refugee population. Most of the refugees are located in some 340 camps, primarily in the rural areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. (See map, p. 8)

The Afghan refugees are minimally but adequately supplied with food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. Relief is provided by Pakistan, and by the international community primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN World Food Program (WFP). Major contributors to the relief program are Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the gulf, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. The U.S. Government contributed about \$70 million for the Afghan refugees in fiscal year 1984, including \$49 million through the WFP. This was approximately one-third the total international contributions for Afghan refugee relief. To date, total U.S. contributions to the Afghan refugee relief program exceed \$350 million.

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Government began relocating refugees from the provincial capitals of NWFP (Peshawar) and Bluchistan (Quetta) to outlying rural areas for the stated purpose of alleviating the urban problems caused by the refugees. All single Afghan males were ordered to relocate from housing in Peshawar or nearby refugee camps to areas away from the city. After a series of bomb explosions in Peshawar, Afghan

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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political parties were ordered to move their headquarters
outside the city.

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The Kabul regime and the Soviet Union demand that "noninterference" be guaranteed by Pakistan and international powers, possibly to include the United States, and appear reluctant to accept extension of the guarantees to any other part of an agreement.

Pakistan continues to refuse to recognize or talk with the Karmal regime and refuses to pledge anything before there is a Soviet agreement to withdraw. Pakistan has expressed its wish that international guarantee cover all points or an agreement.

UN attempts to negotiate a settlement date from November 1980 mandate of the General Assembly. Negotiations are led by UN under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordoves as a personal representative of the Secretary General. Talks have been held periodically in Geneva. Cordoves shuttled between delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of the discussions while unofficially informing the Soviets. The third and latest round of UN sponsored indirect talks in Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held from August 24 to August 31, 1984, and ended without progress.

Despite the hopes that were generated during the 1988 talks, the sides remain far apart. The Soviet Union

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has not substantially altered its original position. Essential questions, such as self determination for the Afghans, consultations with Afghan representatives, the identity of guarantees, have yet to be addressed. But both sides are committed to continuing the talks, and another round is scheduled for February 1986. The United States continues to support the UN negotiating process based on the four points of the UN resolution. Also, the United States supports efforts to achieve unity of all Afghan groups, whether in exile or struggling inside the country

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remain capable of ruling-internally divided and with no significant popular backing.

The Afghan people, on the other hand, despite tremendous privations and the dislocations attendant to modern warfare practiced against a traditional society, show every sign of persevering. Their support for the resistance seems unflagging. While some resistance groups increased cooperation during 1984, a broad degree of unity still would be insufficient to militarily eject the Soviets. Yet the Soviets are unable to prevent the resistance from effectively attacking in all areas of the country, including Kabul, the nerve center of Soviet control.

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